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Johann Park
The long-term progressions of political freedom and economic wealth have characterized the 
post-World War era. The scholarly debate on how democracy and economic development are related, 
although having continued over multiple decades, is still lively. Does a more democratic world lead 
to a wealthier world? Does a more affluent world ensure a freer world? Or are political development 
and economic development separate processes independent from each other? This present study aims 
to help establish the causality between political development and economic development at a macro 
systemic level. I identify the possible causal mechanisms for the democracy-development nexus and 
draw a testable hypothesis. Empirically, I set up a set of vector autoregression-based Granger causality 
tests. The test results do not support any causal relationship between world democracy and world 
development.        
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IntroductIon
Both democracy and market economy characterize this current, most globalized era. 
democracy seems to be the most preferred form of political system across the world. 
economic development, through free market and free trade, appears to be the most desirable 
achievement for any political regime across the globe. How are democracy and economic 
development related to each other? Does democracy cause development? Does development 
causes democracy? Do they cause each other? Or are they separate processes having 
developed coincidently? The democracy-development nexus has constituted one of the most 
prevalent topic in both political science and economics. numerous studies have focused on 
one-way causal relationships, concerning either the effect of democracy on development 
or the effect of development on democracy. However, surprisingly scant research directly 
and comprehensively addresses the possible two-way causation between democracy and 
development, especially at the world systemic level. This study investigates whether or not 
democracy and economic development cause each other at the macro systemic level.  
Can we expect that a more developed world brings about a more democratized world? 
Does a more democratic world induce a wealthier world? In fact, indicators for both world 
democracy and world economic development have shown to be steadily increasing in the 
post-World War era. according to the Polity project that measures democracy with a 21-point 
scale from -10 (full autocracy) to 10 (full democracy), the average democracy score for 
the whole world has ultimately increased from -0.31 in 1960 to 4.08 in 2018, despite some 
interrupted setbacks. according to World Bank data, the per capita average for world gDP 
has steadily ascended from about $3746 in 1960 to about $11075 in 2019 in constant 2010 
uS dollars. the plots later shown in Figure 1 demonstrate well these two upward trends in 
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world democracy and world development.  
This present study aims to provide theoretical rationales and statistical evidence for 
the causality between democracy and development at the global systemic level. after 
examining theoretical possibilities, I conduct a set of granger causality tests by using vector 
autoregressive models. Through vaR models, I regress the annual per capita world gDP 
against the annual world democracy score and a set of its lagged values to test whether 
world democracy granger causes world development. Conversely, I predict the annual world 
democracy score by the annual per capita gDP and a set of its lags to determine if world 
development granger causes world democracy. To measure democracy and development, 
I utilize the relevant data collections by the Polity5 project and the World Bank. The time 
intersection of these datasets determines the temporal domain of this present study, 1960-
2018. The results show that world democracy and world development do not granger cause 
each other, suggesting that the developmental processes of world politics and world economy 
have been historically coincident but these two processes are separate, increasing trends, 
causally independent from each other. 
The remainder of this paper first discusses previous research on the relationship 
between democracy and economic development to explore the theoretical and empirical 
possibilities about how democracy and economic development affect each other. along with 
these discussions, I present specific hypotheses for empirical testing. What follow are the 
discussion for the measurement and method and the presentation of the statistical results. I 
conclude this paper with implications for the real world and future research.            
DeMOCRaCy-DevelOPMenT CaUsalITy
This section addresses whether and how democracy and development are related to each 
other in terms of causality at the world systemic level. Can the increasing trend of global 
democracy be translated into world development through a causal process? Does the soaring 
increase of average world income give rise to political development as a causal effect? These 
two processes can be simultaneously at work as a two-way causal relationship. I start this 
section by presenting a testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis: World democracy and world development Granger cause each other. 
In what follows, I discuss theoretical and empirical rationales for the presented 
hypothesis. In doing so, I identify mechanisms for each of the two-way causations building 
upon the literature on the relationship between democracy and economic development. 
alternatively, the two variables may not be causally related to each other. so, I also identify 
counter arguments for the hypothesis. 
The Effect of Development on Democracy
lipset’s (1959) study is seminal on the effect of economic development on democracy. 
He argues that economic development is the most important prerequisite for democracy. 
steady advanced economies pave the road toward democracy, along with “industrialization, 
wealth, urbanization, and education” (p. 71). economic development changes the social 
conditions of lower strata workers, lessening their commitment to old ideologies, making 
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them less susceptive to extremist ideas, and instead exposing them to middle class values. It 
also enlarges the size and political roles of the middle class, which highly values individual 
rights and political freedom. 
since lipset’s (1959) seminal work, scholars have elaborated theoretical mechanisms 
for the effect of development on democracy. This literature, by and large, suggests three 
mechanisms. The first mechanism emphasizes the roles of economic development in 
facilitating industrialization and urbanization. Industrialization and urbanization allow people 
to have pluralized sociopolitical interests and values (Dahl 1971) and expanded social ties 
(Tilly 2000). These processes encourage citizens to feel the importance of political rights and 
civil liberties. The second mechanism focuses on the socioeconomic dynamics that economic 
development brings about in favor of democracy. Increased income with development 
promotes socioeconomic mobility while reducing inequality and distributional conflict (Boix 
2003). Through these dynamics, citizens come to a realization that they can earn income and 
raise status without government help and rent seeking and thus they need extended political 
freedom (Bilson 1982). The third mechanism is that development results in rising educational 
levels, which makes people realize the importance of equality, independent thinking, 
individual autonomy, and free choice (Pennar et al., 1993; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). newly 
emerging knowledge societies will stimulate citizens to agitate for their pair shot, political 
rights and civil liberties that can be procured only by democracy.    
supportive cross-national empirical evidence for the modernization thesis has been 
documented by many studies over the decades. examples include Burkhart and lewis-Beck 
(1994), londregan and Poole (1996), Feng (1997), Boix and stokes (2003), epstein et al. 
(2006), Boix (2011), Moral-Benito and Bartolucci (2012), and Benhabib et al. (2013). Most 
recently, Treisman (2015) finds that the positive effect of economic development on the 
emergence of democracy does not occur spontaneously in a short time window but happens 
in the medium term, perhaps over 10 to 20 years. Increased income provides dictators 
with political legitimacy and resources to strengthen their hold on power. Development 
ultimately will bring about democracy, but only after an incumbent dictator with successful 
economic records leaves office for whatever reasons. Based on this finding, Treisman (2020) 
suggests a modified modernization theory that the democracy-generating effect of economic 
development is triggered by disruptive internal and external events like economic crises and 
military defeats. 
The discussion of modernization theory in its original and modified forms suggests that 
economic development leads to democratization and its consolidation at the state level. 
If national incomes increase across many parts of the world, there will be more emerging 
democracies and consolidated democracies. This gives a system-level implication that higher 
levels of world development lead to higher levels of world democracy. 
In addition to the extension of the state-level mechanisms, we can develop some 
mechanisms that work at the system level. World development affects the levels of 
democracy for individual countries for the following reasons. First, what has underpinned 
the rise of democracy and liberalism is the successful trajectory of the world economy. In the 
modern world system, liberal capitalism has been the engine for economic development with 
few exceptions (Bremer 1992). Booms legitimate the prevailing systems of global political 
economy. It is fortunate for liberal democracy that “more wealth for more people has been 
generated in societies calling themselves liberal, democratic, and capitalist” (Karabell 2017). 
However, history shows that when the world is in economic downturns, democracy has been 
seriously threatened by the rise of nationalism and fascism in many corners of the world. 
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Second, as suggested, the progression of the world economy has been made with 
the expansion of market economies and economic integration expedited by increasing 
globalization. these processes are characterized by the increasing roles of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), technological advances, international trade, and economic international 
institutions. World economic booms may not occur unless these workforces operate in favor 
of many economies across the world. In fact, studies provide evidence for their auspicious 
associations with economic development (Borensztein et al., 1998; nelson and nelson 2005; 
Mukherjee 2008; Busse and Koeniger 2015). Thus, a large scale expansion of the world 
economy is likely when these workforces work to their full capacity in a positive direction. 
specifically, international businesses demand the transparency and liability of political 
and economic institutions in potential investment countries (Crackett 2011). They also 
consider whether investment countries have enforceable systems of property rights and 
impartial courts (Keck and sikkink 2014). In fact, li and Reuveny’s (2003) statistical 
analysis reveals that FDI inflows positively affects the levels of democracy in hosting 
countries. Technological advances have penetrated most of the closed societies in the world. 
Various telecommunications facilitate the infusion of democratic norms and principles into 
these societies. There has been the rise of technocrats in government and politics across 
the world. There have been the steady inflows of technocrats from advanced democracies 
to developing autocracies. The increased influence of technocrats helps make governments 
more accountable and transparent (Dalpino 2001). International trade and economic 
openness positively affect democracy. lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008) find that as 
countries, whether already democratic or still autocratic, increase trade with other countries, 
they become more democratic. The increasing expansion of international institutions has 
been responsible for the fast globalization of the world economy. examples include from 
economic organizations like WTO, IMF, and World Bank, through regional integration 
projects like the eU, naFTa, various PTas and FTas, to security organizations like naTO. 
Joining these international organizations and adhering to their rules require member countries 
to make more transparent and accountable governments (Dalpino 2001). Domestic pro-
democracy activist groups will find opportunities as international organizations can provide 
some protection, information, and capacity building assistance (Kim 2013). In line with this 
reasoning, Pevehouse (2002) offers supportive evidence that membership in international 
organizations, although limited to regional ones, promotes democratic transitions. All in all, 
the discussion suggests that trend of globalization expedited by booms in the world economy 
increases the intensity and effectiveness of the pro-democratic international factors.            
The Effect of Democracy on Economic Development
A 17th century political philosopher, James Harrington, pioneered the idea that democratic 
governing structures promote economic development when he published The Commonwealth 
of Oceanea in 1656. In the modern era, it is Mancur Olson’s 1982 seminal work, Rise 
and Decline of Nations, that revived the idea that the institutional fabric of government is 
associated with economic development. although Olson highlights the possibility that stable 
mature democracies are prone to economic stagnations, he upholds that stable democracies 
are fundamentally important for long-term economic growth. 
since Olson’s (1982) seminal work, scholars have identified several theoretical 
mechanisms for the positive effect of democracy on economic development. These 
mechanisms can be categorized into four kinds. The first mechanism emphasizes the roles 
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of democratic rules and checks-and-balances systems in ensuring long-term economic 
development. In reality, extraordinarily rapid growth tends to appear with developmental 
dictatorships in poor countries. But, such growth lasts no longer than the span of one or 
two dictators’ rule. To this point, Olson (1993) argues that a well-established democracy 
is necessary for lasting economic development since it protects individual property rights 
and its independent judiciary facilitates fair contract enforcement. Lasting democracies 
seem to be equipped with all the essential requisites that are necessary for long-term and 
maximum economic development. On this, north (1990, 2005) explains why. He argues that 
the institutional structures of societies shape their economic trajectories. Political elites are 
generally predatory and thus need to be constrained by various institutional devices such as 
political competitions, separation of power, and checks and balances. the rules and systems 
of democracy hinder predatory leaders, protect property rights, and enforce contracts. Indeed, 
many political economists suggest that political freedom and economic freedom reinforce 
each other, improving property rights and facilitating market competition, which in turn 
stimulates economic development (Friedman 1962; sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Barro 1997). 
according to leblang’s (1996) cross-national time-series analysis, property rights have a 
statistically meaningful impact in enhancing economic growth. 
The second mechanisms can be drawn from the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. (2003). The size of the winning coalitions matters for governments to pursue national 
interests than parochial ones. For their political survival, leaders in democracies need to 
satisfy a broader range of constituents as compared to those in autocracies, and thus their 
policies tend to be oriented toward enhancing public goods. Public goods such as national 
security, property rights, civil liberties, the rule of law, public health, education, and other 
social services benefit almost everyone in the society and facilitate market exchange 
activities. These all contribute to making market-friendly environments conducive to steady 
economic growth. 
the third mechanism highlights how democratic constraints and accountability produce 
growth-generating effects by reducing rent seeking but increasing financial power. Lake 
(1992) argues in a different context that democracies generate greater national wealth and 
military capability than do autocracies. Rent-seeking behaviors are greatly inhibited, and 
thus there are relatively few economic distortions made in democracies. Reduced economic 
distortions are important for what schultz and Weingast (2003, 3) call “the democratic 
advantage” that produces large financial power. leader-sanctioning mechanisms associated 
with liberal democratic institutions allow punishing ill-behaving leaders and rewarding 
well-behaving ones. such mechanisms have democrats bearing higher levels of political 
accountability than autocrats. Thanks to these relatively high levels of constraints and 
accountability, democratic governments “enjoy superior access to credit and lower interest 
rates than” autocratic governments. Debtholders will find it easier to sanction democratic 
state leaders than autocratic state leaders, who have more discretion in the event of default. 
Additionally, democratic constraints and accountability minimize economic distortions. these 
all are consistent with long-term economic growth that helps win prolonged competitions 
with foreign rivals.   
numerous empirical studies have assessed the effect of democracy on development over 
the last three decades. In general, the findings have been mixed and inconclusive, differing 
across studies. Most recently, Colagrossi et al. (2020) conduct a meta-analysis using 188 
papers and 2047 regression results covering 36 years of research. Their finding shows that 
democracy has a significant direct positive impact on economic growth. They also investigate 
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875 models from 111 studies to meta-analyze the effect of democracy on human capital. They 
find this indirect growth-generating effect of democracy significant and robust, although 
weaker than its direct effect. 
The discussion leads us to expect at the macro level that a world full of democracies 
should be more affluent than a world full of autocracies. Increased democratic governance in 
individual states aggregates up to an increase in global democracy. The resulting increased 
income in individual states adds up to an increase in world income. We can draw some 
macro-level mechanisms that global democracy affects economic development in individual 
states. First, democracy pacifies contemporary interstate relations as democracies rarely fight 
with each other in the Cold War and post-Cold War systems (Park 2013). a more democratic 
world provides a more peaceful and international environment in favor of economic 
development at both of the state and global levels. Peace, security and political stability are 
necessary for trade and sustained economic growth (gowa and Mansfield 1993; aisen and 
veiga 2013). The regions surrounded by democracies provide more stable, peaceful, and 
conducive milieus for diplomatic negotiations, interstate cooperation, economic integration, 
and economic growth than those surrounded by autocracies (gleditsch 2002; Mitchell 2002; 
Mansfield et al. 2008). as discussed above, trade and integration are helpful for the sustained 
growth of the world economy. Bosker and garretsen (2009) provide direct evidence that 
democratic neighborhood leads to a higher national gDP per capita as well as better domestic 
governance.
second, democracy per se reduces the trade barriers across borders. Mansfield et al. (2000) 
argue that the required legislative ratification processes allow democracies to set a lower 
trade barrier with other democracies. They find that democracies are more likely to trade with 
each other than other types of countries. also suggestive is Kleinberg and Fordham’s (2010) 
finding that citizens in middle-income democracies carry less unfavorable attitudes toward 
the uS than they do towards china, the two largest economies that account for a substantial 
share of world trade and investment. It seems that other things being equal, citizens in 
democracies seem to prefer democratic trading partners than autocratic trading partners. 
These all suggest that international trade is more prevalent with a more democratic world. as 
has been discussed, trade is a main engine for the expansion of global economy.
the third mechanism is that global democracy can contribute to national economy and 
global economy by promoting the flows of FdI across the world. democratic countries, 
in general, are found to attract more FDI inflows (Jensen 2003; Busse and Hefeker 2007) 
although this may not apply to some of developing democracies with large natural resource 
dependence (asiedu and lien 2011) and low economic freedom (Mathur and singh 2013). 
The FDI-attracting effect of democracy even benefits nondemocratic countries that are 
surrounded by democratic neighbors because democratic neighborhood helps hosting 
countries improve institutional quality, enlarge economic returns, and lower the chance of 
experiencing armed conflict (Pinar and stengos 2020). FDI can assist hosting countries to 
grow their economies (Borensztein et al. 1998). Malikane and Chitambara (2017) find that 
FDI has a direct positive impact on economic growth. Further, they show that this growth-
generating impact is larger for democratic hosting countries than their nondemocratic 
counterparts because democracies are better able to absorb technological spillovers from 
other developed democracies. Taken together, the discussion suggests that a larger proportion 
of democracies in the world facilitates global FDI flows and intensifies the grow-contributing 
effect of FDI by helping improve institutional quality across the borders. 
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Non-Causal Relationship
although consensus seems to be leaning toward the positive association between 
democracy and development in the literature, it is fair to identify skeptical views. Over long 
decades, scholars have raised skepticism about the relationship between democracy and 
development. earlier sceptics have questioned the development-democracy nexus (Moore 
1966; O’Donnell 1973). More recent sceptics do not deny that development and democracy 
are correlated, but they question whether the relationship is causal. Przeworski and limongi 
(1997) argue that economic growth does not cause the emergence of democracy. Rather, 
the relationship is exogenous, meaning that high income helps a democracy last longer. 
Although democratization is increasingly likely for poor dictatorships as their income rises, 
increased wealth also helps dictatorships stabilize their regimes. Przeworski and limongi 
(1997, 177) note that “[t]he emergence of democracy is not a by-product of economic 
development…. [I]t can be initiated at any level of development.” luo and Przeworski (2019) 
assert that political development and economic development are historically coincident but 
causally separate processes. In the pre-Industrial Revolution era, all countries were under-
industrialized and underdeveloped so there was relatively little variance of income among 
countries. But, at a certain historical period, a lead country suddenly industrialized and grew 
faster. More and more countries followed this path, and ultimately the lead country’s growth 
rate and the followers’ growth rate converged to a similar rate. likewise, in earlier eras, all 
countries were autocracies but at a certain historical point, a lead country suddenly started to 
be democratized. and more and more countries followed this path over long time.  
In a similar vein, acemoglu et al. (2008) argue that the historical coincidence of 
development and democracy is not causal. Instead, some divergent confounding factors 
rooted in colonial era history such as the demise of feudalism, the age of industrialization, 
the mode of colonial institutions, religion, and the date of independence accounts for the 
correlation. These historical variables interlinked economic and political development at 
certain historical junctures. In fact, the two-way fixed effects regression that the authors 
adopt to account for country-specific heterogeneities and year-specific shocks to the system 
removes the statistical significance for the association between income and democracy for 
the 1960-2000 period. For the data of an extensive range, 1500-2000, their inclusion of the 
historical variables eliminates the statistical significance of the income-democracy nexus.  
Baum and lake (2003) examine the direct and indirect effect of democracy on economic 
growth. Using a cross-national dataset of 128 countries for 1967-1997, they find no 
statistically significant direct effect. Instead, they find that democracy affects growth only 
indirectly through public health and education. Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) use time-series 
cross-national data to test the effect of democracy on income. They find that the relationship 
between democracy and income is statistically insignificant for the whole sample period 
of 1870-2000 and other subsamples of 1900-2000 and 1930-2000. Doucouliagos and 
Ulubasoglu (2008) conduct a meta-analysis examination of 483 coefficient-estimates from 
84 studies. They find no significant result for the direct impact of democracy on economic 
growth. At best, democracy affects economic growth only through indirect means by 
increasing human capital and economic freedom while lowering political instability.
Taken together, these null findings for the effect of democracy on development and that 
of development on democracy lead us to expect that there might be no causality between 
democracy and development. However, expecting no causality between them is contradictory 
to what have been discussed theoretically and empirically in the two previous subsections. 
62 JOHann PaRK
This present study, adopting a granger causality approach, should help model the appropriate 
relationship between democracy and development in the literature.
The Causality between Democracy and Development
some previous studies conduct granger causality tests for the relationship between 
democracy and development. Heo and Tan (2001) find two-way granger causality, one 
causation from growth to democracy and the other causation from democracy to growth. 
However, their spatial and temporal domains only cover 32 states and 33 years, from 1950-
1982. also, they run 32 separate granger causality tests for 32 different states. Hence, their 
findings are inconclusive for the macro-level causality between world democracy and world 
development. For instance, the authors report the growth → democracy granger causality for 
11 countries, the democracy → growth granger causality for 10 countries, two-way granger 
causality for 3 countries, and no relationship for 8 countries. additionally, they measure 
growth in terms of growth rate. However, what is usually theorized is how the levels, not 
growth rate, of wealth or development help increase the levels of democracy and vice versa. 
Boix (2011), using a cross-national time series dataset of over 130 countries for the 1820-
2000, runs a granger causality test between the levels of income and political regime. His test 
shows that income granger causes democracy but not vice versa. However, Boix’s finding 
is for an average point estimate for the cross-national time-series panel rather than a macro-
systemic level point estimate for world democracy and world development. In contrast to 
Boix, acemoglu et al. (2019) report an exact opposite finding, that democracy causes growth. 
as such, previous research remains inconclusive about the causality between democracy 
and economic development at the cross-national level, and no studies have examined it at the 
macro-systemic level. In the following sections, I set out to help clarify the debate by adding 
evidence from the macro-systemic level.             
DaTa anD MeTHODs
I measure the macro-systemic level democracy by taking the annual average of all 
countries’ scores for democracy in a given year. For democracy scores, I use the polity score 
of the Polity5 Project. It captures countries’ levels of democracy and autocracy on a 21-point 
scale ranging from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic). I call this variable world 
democracy. as for the system-level measure of economic development, I use the information 
on the per capita national gDPs in 2010 Us dollars from the World Bank national accounts 
data. I take the average of all countries’ per capita gDPs in a given year to measure the 
annual macro-level of development as a whole in the world. I call this variable world 
development. While the Polity data cover well over 200 years, from 1800 to 2018, the World 
Bank data cover only the 1960-2018 period. There are several sources for the per capita gDP 
data that cover the pre-1960 years. However, these data sources are quite unreliable and only 
available for a small set of countries. This present study covers the joint section of the World 
Bank and Polity Project data, 1960-2018. The post-war period is the most commonly used 
sample period in the literature and the most hotly debated years about the causality between 
democracy and development (Przeworski and limongi 1997; gowa 1999; acemoglu et al. 
2008; Boix 2011; Treisman 2015; Colagrossi et al. 2020). 
The vector auto regression (vaR) model that I set up for granger causality tests has two 
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equations, as follows:
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where et and vt denotes stochastic errors at time t = 0, assumed to have no autocorrelation 
within each series and no cross correlation with each other. usually, the time series processes 
of two variables are assumed to be stationary and integrated at t = 0, I(0). I test these 
assumptions in the analysis section. p refers to the appropriate order of lags while m refers to 
the additional number of lags added to the vaR system for nonstationary data, as explained 
in more details in the next section. Once this vaR system of equations is set up, granger 
causality is tested by assessing whether the past values of one variable (t-1…t-p) predict 
the present values of the other variables (t=0). Formally, one conducts an F test for the joint 
significance of the p lag coefficients of X on Y in one equation. If the null hypothesis that the 
p lag coefficients are jointly equal to 0 is rejected, one can conclude that X granger causes y. 
The same procedure in the reverse order is conducted for testing the granger causality of y 
on X.
analyses anD ResUlTs 
In Table 1, I present the summary statistics for the yearly averages of country polity 
scores and country per capita gDP values, measuring world development and world 
democracy. For the 1960-2018 period, the average for world democracy is 0.7521966 out of 
the 21-point polity scale from -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully democratic) and the average 
for world development is $7140.579 in the 2010 Us constant dollars.  
It is informative to see how world democracy and world development in their values 
have changed over the years. The annual trends of world democracy and world development 
are described in Figure 1. Following through the red line with hollow circles, we can trace 
the annual changes in the levels of world development. Chasing through the green line with 
Xs, we can observe the changes in the annual means for all countries’ polity scores. There 
are clear and steady upward movements for both world democracy and world development. 
These two macro-level variables seem to trend together over time, suggesting not only 
that they may be nonstationary time-series processes but also that these series may be co-
integrated. If these two conditions are the case, usual VAr models may lead to spurious 
regressions. Facing these possible difficulties, I follow the procedures suggested by Toda and 
yamamoto (1995) to property conduct the vaR-based granger causality testing.       
the first step of a usual VAr analysis is to determine the length of lags, p, for both 
endogenous variables, world democracy and world development. I use the akaike 
Table 1. summary statistics for World Democracy and World Development, 1960-2018
Variables Mean std. Dev. Minimum Maximum n
World Democracy .7521966 2.534036 -2.609929 4.218182 59
World Development 7140.579 1950.218 3746.056 10918.53 59
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information criterion (aIC) and values and schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion 
(sBIC). The results presented in Table 2 indicate that the optimal lag length are 2. Further, 
one needs to test if the vaR with the suggested length of lags is well specified without serial 
correlation in its residuals. Otherwise, the maximum lag length should be increased until no 
autocorrelation is present. I apply a vaR version of the lagrange multiplier (lM) test and 
find that autocorrelation is not concerned with p=2.   
Then, I perform the augmented Dickey Fuller (aDF) tests to check whether our time-
series data are stationary with the lag length of 2. Presented in Table 3, the aDF tests produce 
insignificant results for the null hypothesis of a unit root for both world democracy and 
world development. Therefore, both variables appear to be non-stationary in their levels 
with a unit root—random walk with a drift. In this case, according to Toda and yamamoto 
Figure 1. The Trends of World Democracy and World Development
Table 2. lag length and autocorrelation: Information Criteria and lM Test
Statistics for the Lag Length LM test for Autocorrelation
Lag Length AIc sBIC chi2 p > chi2
0 20.9163 20.9893
1 12.2104 12.4294 5.4089 0.24786
2 11.8224* 12.1874* 5.9128 0.20575
3 11.8315 12.3425 1.0642 0.89992
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procedure, the next step with the two non-stationary time series is to examine the maximum 
order of integration, m, by differencing. The first order differencing (t - t-1) makes both 
series stationary, as shown in the right half of Table 3. Therefore, the two variables, world 
democracy and world development, are found to be first-order integrated, I(1), and thus m = 1. 
Once the maximum lag length p and the maximum order of integration m are determined, 
the next step of the Toda and yamamoto procedure is to set up the vaR model with the time 
variables in their levels and p + m lags in each of the vaR equations. Then, the following 
step is to test for granger causality using a standard Wald test against the coefficients of only 
the p lags excluding the coefficients of the m additional lags. 
The results for the vaR estimation are reported in Table 4. Interpreting the individual 
autoregressive coefficients of the lagged terms is usually regarded as meaningless as each 
describes a fluctuation point of the whole dynamic system at a particular time point. An 
alternative is to sum the individual lagged coefficients of the exogenous factor in one equation 
of the vaR model to assess its overall impact on the endogenous factor. summing up the 
individual autoregressive coefficients balances out their contrasting signs and magnitudes 
and gives an overall point estimate as utilized in distributed lagged models (Oneal et al. 
2003; Park 2020). In the first vaR equation (Model 1), world democracy is regressed against 
the three lags of world development along with its own three lags. all of the coefficients 
for world development are statistically insignificant. excluding the coefficient for the 
additional m (third order) lag, the coefficients for the p (first and second order) lags of world 
development are summed, ∑(l1/l2. Development) in the column of Model 1. The summed 
coefficient is positive but statistically insignificant. It appears that world development 
does not promote world democracy. In Model 2, the lagged impact of world democracy on 
world development is assessed. none of the lagged coefficients for world democracy has a 
statistically significant effect on world development. The summed coefficient for the first 
and second order lags of world democracy, ∑(l1/l2. Democracy), is actually negative, but 
statistically insignificant. The insignificant results for the vaR model suggest that a steady 
increasing movement of world democratization is not translated into making an increasingly 
wealthy world. Conversely, there is no evidence that an increasingly affluent world economy 
is effective in making the world more democratic over time. 
likewise, the test results for granger causality reported in Table 5 do not lend support 
for the presence of causality between world democracy and world development in any 
direction. The Wald test statistic for the joint impact of the first and second order lags of 
world development on world democracy is not statistically significant at any conventional 
significance level. The same F test for the joint effect of the first and second order lags of 
world democracy on world development is not statistically significant either. Based on 
these results, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of granger non-causality between world 
Table 3. the Augmented dickey-Fuller tests for unit root
level series Differenced series
t-statistic prob. t-statistic prob.
World Democracy -2.385 0.3874 -2.931 0.0419
World Development -0.804 0.9653 -5.584 0.0000
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democracy and world development in both directions. Therefore, we conclude that world 
democracy does not granger cause world development and that world development does not 
granger cause world democracy. 
Finally, I conduct a cointegration test using Johansen’s (1991) tracing method. The null 
hypothesis of the trace statistic states that there are no more than r conintegrating relations 
among multiple time-series variables. The test result reported in Table 6 suggests that there 
is no evidence of a cointegration between world democracy and world development times 
series. This finding of no cointegration is expected as our vaR-based granger causality 
tests find no evidence for the causality whether the causality running from world democracy 
to world economy or from world development to world democracy. If two (or more) 
nonstationary time-series variables are cointegrated, there must be granger causality between 
them, at least in a one-way causal direction. However, the reverse is not true. granger 
causality can exist between two time-series variables without cointegration. In case of a 
Table 4. vector autoregression estimation for World Democracy and World Development
Lagged Variables Model 1y = Democracy
Model 2
y = Development
Developmentt-1 0.0004 (0.0003) 1.1406*** (0.1384)
Developmentt-2 -0.0003 (0.0005) -0.3849 (0.2033)
Developmentt-3 -0.00004 (0.0003) 0.2363 (0.1319)
∑(l1/l2. Development) 0.0001 (0.0003)
democracyt-1 1.3962*** (0.1398) -84.1640 (61.4195)
democracyt-2 -0.2074 (0.2456) 50.2687 (109.69)
Democracyt-3 -0.2376 (0.1441) 49.7701 (64.3485)
∑(l1/l2. Democracy) -33.8953 (63.6505)
n=56, R2=0.9943 n=56, R2=0.9978
*p<0.05, p**<0.01, p***<0.001
Table 5. granger Causality Tests: World Democracy and World Development
causality direction F (2, 49) p < F decision
Development → Democracy 0.96 0.3899 no granger causality
Democracy → Development 1.93 0.1561 no granger causality
Table 6. Cointegration Test (Johannsen’s Trace Test)
null Hyp. Log-likelihood trace statistic 5% critical value
r = 0 -327.2896 15.4334 18.17
r ≤ 1 -321.4933 3.8409 3.74
r ≤ 2 -319.5729
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cointegrating relation between two nonstationary time-series processes, one may consider 
using a vector error correction model, which combines the data in levels and in differences, 
instead of a vaR in levels. 
all in all, the granger causal analysis conducted in this present study does not give 
any evidence for a causal relationship between world democracy and world development. 
With respect to hypothesis testing, the finding of no granger causality is unsupportive 
of Hypothesis 1. Indeed, world development and world democracy appear to be separate 
processes, although they show a common increasing trend over time.    
COnClUDIng ReMaRKs
The world has been steadily improving in terms of political freedom and economic 
wellbeing in the years after World War II. The proportion of democracies has increased over 
time, although interrupted by some setbacks and reverse waves, and now the majority of 
the world’s countries are democracies, according to the Polity Project. The per capita world 
income has risen consecutively from 1960 to 2019, except for 5 separate intermittent years: 
1976, 1982, 1991, 1993, and 2009, according the World Bank data in 2010 Us constant 
dollars. likewise, according to the poverty headcount ratio data of the World Bank, the 
percentage of the world population living below $1.90 a day in terms of purchasing power 
parity in 2011 constant international dollars has dramatically decreased from 42.3% in 1981 
to 10 % in 2015. are these improvements in world politics and world economy related to 
each other? Does an improvement in one area lead to an improvement in the other area? Or 
are world democracy and world development separate independent processes, although they 
have been coincidentally progressing starting from a certain historical juncture? 
This present study examines the causality between democracy and economic development 
at a macro-systemic level. I identify an overarching granger-causality hypothesis, drawing 
from the three different lines of research in the literature. One strand of research suggests 
that economic development promotes political development. Development pluralizes and 
individualizes citizens’ social consciousness, values and interests. Increased income changes 
the social conditions and enhances higher education. Indeed, the research regards economic 
development and wealth as a most important prerequisite in line with lipset’s (1959) 
modernization theory. another strand of research concerns the possible positive impact that 
democracy has on economic development. Democracy leads to economic development by 
promoting economic freedom and protecting property rights. the institutional characteristics 
of democratic systems, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, political competitions, 
regular elections, political transparency, and the large size of winning coalitions, constrain 
leaders and governments from engaging in rent-seeking behavior and private goods-oriented 
policy. these all enable democracies to enjoy long-term economic growth. A third set of 
arguments hold that political development and economic development began to happen 
coincidently at a certain historical juncture in a certain place. At that juncture, countries 
embarked on divergent political-economic paths: some moved to freedom and prosperity 
while others remained poor and undemocratic. although democracy and development tend to 
go hand in hand, they are not causally associated with each other. 
In addition to these state-level mechanisms, I draw rationales for the causality between 
democracy and economic development at the macro-systemic level. I discuss how the 
expansion of world development leads to increased democratic governance for individual 
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countries and the improvement of world democracy. I also delineate how the expansion 
of world democracy contributes to economic development for individual states and world 
economy. 
I test the macro-systemic level causality between democracy and development, expecting 
that if one process leads to the other a more developed world in one aspect means a more 
developed world in the other respect. I employ the Toda-yamamoto procedure to set a vector 
autoregression model for granger causality tests because world development and world 
democracy are nonstationary time-series processes with a upward trend. the data for the 
1960-2018 period do not lend support for a causal relationship between world democracy 
and world development. The Wald F-test statistics for the granger causality tests are below 
the critical value of significance, and thus we fail to reject the null hypothesis of granger 
non-causality between the two variables. We conclude that world democracy and world 
development do not granger cause each other, as expected in Hypothesis 3.  
An implication for future research can be drawn from this present research. Since there 
is no evidence for the causality between democracy and economic development, what really 
explains the apparent historical correlation between political development and economic 
development remains a puzzle. Have these two development processes just followed 
historically coincident paths as luo and Przeworski (2019) argue? Or could it be that a third 
confounding factor has caused both democratization and capitalization as Acemoglu et al. 
(2008) argue? It would be fruitful to answer these questions by exploring possible candidate 
third factors.
Article Received: 12-09-2020 Revised: 10-11-2020 Accepted: 15-11-2020
rEFErEncES
acemoglu, Daron, simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre yared. 2008. “Income and 
Democracy.” American Economic Review 98(3): 808-842.
acemoglu, Daron, suresh naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James Robinson. 2019. “Democracy 
Does Cause growth.” Journal of Political Economy 127(1): 47-100.
asiedu, elizabeth, and Donald lien. 2011. “Democracy, Foreign Direct Investment and 
natural Resources.” Journal of International Economics 84(1):99-111.
aisen, ari, and Francisco veiga. 2013. “How does Political Instability affect economic 
growth?.” European Journal of Political Economy 29:151-167.
Barro, Robert. 1997. Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study. 
Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press. 
Baum, Matthew, and David lake. 2003. “The Political economy of growth: Democracy and 
Human Capital.” american Journal of Political science 47(2): 333-347.
Benhabib, Jess, alejandro Corvalan, and Mark spiegel. 2013. “Income and Democracy.” 
Economics Letters 118(3):489-492.
Bilson, John. 1982. “Civil liberty-an econometric Investigation.” Kyklos 35(1): 94-114.
Boix, Carles. 2011. “Democracy, Development, and the International system.” American 
Political Science Review 105(4):809-828.
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and Redistribution. new york: Cambridge University Press. 
Boix, Carles, and susan stokes. 2003. “endogenous Democratization.” World Politics 
55(4):517-549.
DeMOCRaCy anD DevelOPMenT 69
Borensztein, eduardo, Jose De gregorio, and Jong-Wha lee. 1998. “How Does Foreign 
Direct Investment affect economic growth?” Journal of International Economics 
45(1):115-135.
Bosker, Maarten, and Harry garretsen. 2009. “economic Development and the geography of 
Institutions.” Journal of Economic Geography 9(3):295-328.
Bremer, stuart a. 1992. “Dangerous dyads: Conditions affecting the likelihood of Interstate 
War, 1816-1965.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 309-341.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, alastair smith, Randolph siverson and James Morrow. 2003. The 
Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press.
Burkhart, Ross, and Michael lewis-Beck. 1994. “Comparative Democracy: The economic 
Development Thesis.” American Political Science Review 88(4): 903-910. 
Busse, Matthias, and Carsten Hefeker. 2007. “Political Risk, Institutions and Foreign Direct 
Investment.” European Journal of Political Economy 23(2): 397-415.
Busse, Matthias, and Jens Koeniger. 2015. “Trade and economic growth: a Re-examination 
of the empirical evidence. Economics Bulletin 35(4): 2862-2876.
colagrossi, Marco, domenico rossignoli, and Mario Maggioni. 2020. “does democracy 
Cause growth? a Meta-analysis (of 2000 Regressions).” European Journal of 
Political Economy 61, 101824. 
Crackett, sophie. 2011. “Has globalization spread Democracy around the World?” 
e-International Relations, august 27, 2011. accessed november 3, 2020. https://
www.e-ir.info/2011/08/27/has-globalization-spread-democracy-around-the-world.  
Dahl, Robert. 1971. Polyarchy. new Haven: yale University Press.
Dalpino, Catharin. 2001. “Does globalization Promote Democracy?” Brookings Review 
19(4):45-48.
Doucouliagos, Hristos, and Mehmet Ulubaşoğlu. 2008. “Democracy and economic growth: 
a Meta‐analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 52(1): 61-83.
epstein, David l, Robert Bates, Jack goldstone, Ida Kristensen and sharyn O’Halloran. 
2006. “Democratic Transitions.” American Journal of Political Science 50(3): 551-
569 
Feng, yi. 1997. “Democracy, Political stability and economic growth.” British Journal of 
Political Science 27(3): 391-418. 
Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press. 
gleditsch, Kristian. 2002. All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, 
Integration, and Democratization. ann arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
gowa, Joanne. 1999. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace. Princeton, nJ: 
Princeton University Press.
gowa, Joanne, and edward Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” 
American Political Science Review 87(2):408-420.
Heo, Uk, and alexander C. Tan. 2001. “Democracy and economic growth: a Causal 
analysis.” Comparative Politics 33(4): 463-473.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and 
Democracy. new york: Cambridge University Press.
Jensen, nathan M. 2003. “Democratic governance and Multinational Corporations: Political 
Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 
57(3):587-616.
Johansen, soren. 1991. “estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration vectors in 
gaussian vector.” Econometrica 59(6): 1551-1580. 
70 JOHann PaRK
Karabell, Cachary, 2017. “Forget Dow 20,000-the Boom Times are Over. Is Democracy 
next?” Foreign Policy, January 27. accessed novermver 2, 2020. https://
foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/26/forget-dow-20k-the-boom-times-are-over-is-
democracy-next. 
Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn sikkink. 2014. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics. Ithaca, ny.: Cornell University Press. 
Kim, Dongwook. 2013. “International nongovernmental Organizations and the global 
Diffusion of national Human Rights Institutions.” International Organization 
67(3):505-539.
Kleinberg, Katja, and Benjamin Fordham. 2010. “Trade and Foreign Policy attitudes.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(5):687-714.
lake, David. 1992. “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic states and War.” American Political 
Science Review 86(1):24-37.
leblang, David. 1996. “Property Rights, Democracy and economic growth.” Political 
Research Quarterly 49(1): 5-26.  
li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 2003. “economic globalization and Democracy: an 
empirical analysis.” British Journal of Political Science 33(1):29-54.
lipset, seymour. 1959. “some social Requisites of Democracy.” American Political Science 
Review 53(1): 69-105.
londregan, John, and Keith Poole. 1996. “Does high Income Promote Democracy?” World 
Politics 49(1): 1-30.
lopez-Cordova, ernesto, and Christopher Meissner. 2008. “The Impact of International 
Trade on Democracy: a long-run Perspective.” World Politics 60(4):539-575.
luo, Zhaotian, and adam Przeworski. 2019. “Why are the Fastest growing Countries 
autocracies?” Journal of Politics 81(2): 676-680.
Malikane, Christopher, and Prosper Chitambara. 2017. “Foreign Direct Investment, 
Democracy and economic growth in southern africa.” African Development Review 
29(1):92-102.
Mansfield, edward, Helen Milner, and Jon Pevehouse. 2008. “Democracy, veto Players and 
the Depth of Regional Integration.” World Economy 31(1):67-96.
Mansfield, edward, Helen Milner, and Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, 
autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94(2):305-
321.
Mathur, aparna, and Kartikeya singh. 2013. “Foreign Direct Investment, Corruption and 
Democracy.” Applied Economics 45(8):991-1002.
Mitchell, sara. 2002. “a Kantian system? Democracy and Third-Party Conflict Resolution.” 
American Journal of Political Science 46(4):749-759.
Moral-Benito, enrique, and Cristian Bartolucci. 2012. “Income and Democracy.” Economics 
Letters 117(3): 844-847.
Mukherjee, Bumba. 2008. “International economic Organizations and economic 
Development: an assessment.” SAIS Review of International Affairs 28(2):123-137.
Murtin, Fabrice, Romain Wacziarg. 2014. “The Democratic Transition.” Journal of Economic 
Growth 19(2): 141-181. 
Moore, Barrington. 1966. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon 
Press.
nelson, Richard R., and Richard Robinson nelson. 2005. Technology, Institutions, and 
Economic Growth. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press.
DeMOCRaCy anD DevelOPMenT 71
north, Douglas. 1990. Institutions, Instructional Change and Economic Performance. new 
york: Cambridge University Press. 
north, Douglas. 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. new Jersey: 
Princeton University Press.  
O’Donnell, guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Olson, Mancur. 1982. The Rise and decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and 
Social Rigidities. new Haven: yale University Press.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development.” American Political 
Science Review 87(3): 567-576.
Oneal, John, Bruce Russett, and Michael Berbaum. 2003. “Causes of Peace: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” International Studies 
Quarterly 47(3): 371-393.  
Park, Johann. 2013. “Forward to the Future? The Democratic Peace after the Cold War.” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 32(2):178-194. 
Park, Johann. 2020. “Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism: a granger Causal 
analysis.” Journal of the Korean Data Analysis Society 22(2): 501-512. 
Pennar, Karen, geri smith, Rose Brady, Dave lindorff, and John Rossant. 1993. “Is 
Democracy Bad for growth?” Business Week, June 7. 
Pinar, Mehmet, and Thanasis stengos. 2020. “Democracy in the neighborhood and Foreign 
Direct Investment.” Review of Development and Economics Forthcoming. 
Pevehouse, Jon. 2002. “Democracy from the Outside-in? International Organizations and 
Democratization.” International Organization 56(3): 515-549.
Przeworski, adam, and Fernando limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts.” 
World Politics 49(2): 155-183.
schultz, Kenneth, and Barry Weingast 2003. “The Democratic advantage: Institutional 
Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” International 
Organization 57(1): 3-42.
sirowy, larry, alex Inkeles. 1990. “The effects of Democracy on economic growth and 
Inequality: a Review.” studies in Comparative International Development 25(1): 126-
157. 
Tilly, Charles. 2000. “Processes and Mechanisms of Democratization.” Sociological Theory 
18(1): 1-16  
Toda, Hiro, and Taku yamamoto. 1995. “statistical Inference in vector autoregressions with 
Possibly Integrated Processes.” Journal of Econometrics 66(1-2): 225-250.
Treisman, Daniel. 2015. “Income, Democracy, and leader Turnover.” American Journal of 
Political Science 59(4): 927-942.
Treisman, Daniel. 2020. “economic Development and Democracy.” Annual Review of 
Political Science Forthcoming. 
Johann Park, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Incheon National University, 
Academy-ro 119, Yeonsu-gu, Incheon, Republic of Korea. Email: johannpark@inu.ac.kr

